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Simona Stano  
University of Turin and New York University 
Marie Curie Fellow 
 
8.1. Introduction: the mediatisation of conspiracy theories 
Contemporary media represent a particularly fertile ground for conspiracy theories (Craft, 
Ashley and Maksl 2017); while in the past it was difficult to disseminate alternative views of 
important events (Olmsted 2009), things have radically changed in present day’s communicative 
environments, where the advances in technology have made it relatively easy for people to 
disseminate a variety of narratives and points of view. This has resulted in a noticeable increase in 
media messages promoting conspiracy theories, with consequences on the public’s belief in such 
theories (cf. Einstein and Glick 2015; Jolley and Douglas 2014a, 2014b; Mulligan and Habel 2012; 
Swami et al. 2013). Official news and information is now more frequently put side by side with 
alternative versions, including unverified data and fake news. In fact, according to the German 
sociologist and philosopher Jürgen Habermas (2006), the separation between fact and fiction has 
been increasingly abandoned: 
 
News and reports and even editorial opinion are dressed up with all the accoutrements of entertainment 
literature. … What in this way only intimates itself in the daily press has progressed further in the newer 
media. … Under the common denominator of so-called human interest emerges the mixtum compositum 
                                                   
1 The theoretical part of this chapter is based on the first results of the research activities developed within the 
project COMFECTION, which has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation 
programme under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie grant agreement No 795025. It reflects only the author’s view and the 
European Research Executive Agency is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains. 
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of a pleasant and at the same time convenient subject for entertainment that, instead of doing justice to 
reality, has a tendency to present a substitute more palatable for consumption and more likely to give rise 
to an impersonal indulgence in stimulating relaxation than to a public use of reason. … With the arrival of 
the new media the form of communication as such has changed; they have had an impact, more 
penetrating (in the strict sense of the word) than was ever possible for the press ([1962] 1991: 170). 
 
Furthermore, technological advances in communication have caused a profound societal 
change with regard to how information is handled: mistrust in institutional authorities and official 
information has resulted “in the claim that everyone holds views of current events and of course 
also in the claim that these views are the only true ones. … Thus conspiratorial interpreting in time 
has become a part of the everyday self–evident handling of information for whose part it has gained 
popularity” (Kimminich 2016: 36). This does not necessarily mean that the Internet and new 
technologies are driving a new age of conspiracy theories (Uscinski and Parent 2014), but is 
certainly relevant and points out the need to deal with online communication for a better 
understanding of conspiracy thinking in nowadays societies. Hence, this chapter aims precisely at 
analysing how conspiracy theories proliferate through contemporary online media — i.e. the so-
called “new media” — and with what effects. While a number of scholarly studies on conspiracy 
theories have focused on their manifestation in the mass media (e.g. literature, cinema, radio and 
television), in fact, only a few (see Erdmann 2016, Madisson 2016, Stano 2016, Thibault 2016 and, 
more generally, Leone 2016 for some case studies) have analysed them in digital media, providing 
interesting but limited results. The same applies to non-scholarly works (see, for instance, Morello 
2004 and McMahon 2004). In order to fill this gap, the following paragraphs will make reference 
not only to research specifically addressing conspiracy theories, but also to relevant findings in 





8.2. The Web 2.0: increasing participation or dis-/misinformation? 
The expression “Web 2.0” (or “participatory” or “social” Web) was introduced by Darcy 
DiNucci in 1999 to make reference to websites promoting participatory culture and allowing their 
users to easily interact with each other through user-generated content in virtual communities. If the 
first stage of the World Wide Web’s evolution (the so-called “Web 1.0”) made people’s access to 
online content mainly passive, because of the competences required to produce and distribute it, the 
Web 2.0 enhances users’ activity and participation by providing them with simpler tools for the 
creation and diffusion of online information. Weblogs, social networks, online forums, and other 
digital media have made it easier to produce and share content online. They allow a personalised 
and multidirectional communication (many-to-many) that exploits the bi-directional channel of the 
network to go beyond the broadcasting model (one-to-many) typical of mass communications. 
Social networks, for instance, not only allow users to easily create and propagate textual, visual or 
audio-visual posts, but have specific functionalities to help users react to and comment on such 
posts, as well as to re-share them (e.g. Twitter’s “retweet” button, Pinterest’s “pin” function, 
Facebook’s “share” option or Tumblr’s “reblog” function). 
While such a transition has resulted in evident advances in communication and information 
systems, enhancing the democratisation of information and making it easier for people to share 
ideas and knowledge, it has also fomented “disinformation” and “misinformation”. That is to say, it 
has resulted in the deliberate or unintentional spread of false or inaccurate information, making fake 
news and conspiracy theories prosper. Information on social media, in fact, does not have to be 
investigated or confirmed2 in order to be shared, and this might lead to unsubstantiated and even 
false rumours spreading like wildfire. 
                                                   
2 Some forms of control have been gradually introduced, precisely as a way to prevent, or at least try to reduce, 
misinformation, but as we discuss more in detail below, they have not proved to be particularly effective, and so 
deceptive and fake news still prosper on social media. 
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Evidently, such phenomena also existed before, but the speed and ubiquity of the Internet 
have provided an extremely fertile ground for alternative narratives, therefore resulting in their 
evident enlargement and rapid spread. Not only do people share and comment on official news and 
bulletins, but more frequently now, as facts occur, Internet users develop their own narratives 
through weblogs and social networks even before such facts are covered by institutional media. As 
a result, the “global village” postulated by Marshall McLuhan (1962; 1964) has rapidly taken the 
shape of an “alternative media ecosystem” (Starbird 2017), namely a complex network of 
individuals and domains that, among other things, generate and promote conspiracy theories that 
undermine online readers’ trust in official information. 
 
8.3. The propagation of conspiracy theories online 
How do conspiracy theories propagate online? How do they manage to become as visible 
and shared as ⎯ when not even more than ⎯ official and proven information? In order to answer 
these questions, the following paragraphs will briefly recall some models and theories developed to 
describe the spread of information on and through social media, pointing out the way they can help 
us understand better how conspiracy theories circulate within contemporary mediascapes. 
 
8.3.1. Virality and memes: reading conspiracy theories through Dawkins’ approach 
and its recent reinterpretations 
The metaphor of virality has been increasingly used to refer to online 
communication and, in particular, social networks (cf. Marino and Thibault 2016). The 
analogy with viruses suggests the idea of a sort of “contagion” taking advantage of the 
permeability of culture to allow specific elements to penetrate, and therefore infect, its 
“DNA”. In accordance with microbiology, such a model conceives viral texts as small 
infectious agents existing in the form of independent particles, whose “genetic code”, which 
is protected by a capsule and other layers that make it impenetrable from the outside, is 
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capable of infecting the DNA of culture’s “cells”, which, on the contrary, have porous 
borders and are therefore open to external elements. In this view, viral particles evolve and 
reproduce by “poisoning” (as the etymology of the word virus suggests) a host organism 
whose immune system is not able to impede — or at least limit — such a contagion.  
Building on Richard Dawkins’ description of meme as a “unit of cultural 
transmission, or a unit of imitation” (1976), that is to say a sort of “cultural gene” moving 
from one brain to another (exactly as genes do move from one body to another), both 
scholarly  (see, for instance, Shifman 2013; Cannizzaro 2016) and common language have 
increasingly adopted the idea of “Internet meme” to describe such mechanisms of contagion. 
More more specifically, the idea of virality has been used to refer to viral content circulating 
on the Internet (McKenzie 1996), thus reinterpreting Dawkins’ definition as a “fitting 
metaphor for Internet culture, affording exact copies of digital artifacts, rapid person-to-
person spread, and enormous storage capacity” (Marwick 2013: 12).  
From such a perspective, the wide spread of conspiracy theories in contemporary 
mediascapes can be seen as an uncontrolled contagion that, thanks to both the permeability 
of culture and the agency of memes, has increasingly affected social discourses. Exactly as 
other viral texts, conspiracy theories would have therefore progressively “infected” the 
Internet, hence finding larger consent among its users.  
However, this view is problematic, since it attributes to Web-users a passive role and 
represents them as infected objects of an external action (that of the viral content), rather 
than as active subjects. In other words, virality theories suggest the reductionist idea that 
messages are totally and unconditionally accepted by their receivers (as it was supported by 
some outmoded models of communication, such as the so-called “magic bullet” or 
“hypodermic needle” theory). Conversely, research has shown that the media have selective 
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influences on people and should be better described by step-flow models3. Furthermore, as 
Henry Jenkins (cf. Jenkins, Ford and Green 2013) pointed out, memes do not have 
operational capacity in and of themselves, which means that they cannot propagate without 
the active intervention of users. The porosity of culture, in other words, is not to be confused 
with the passivity of those who belong to it, as Lotman (1984) effectively pointed out by 
insisting on ideas such as the semiosphere4’s resistance to change and the distinction 
between central and peripheral elements within it. Subjects inhabiting the cultural and 
communicative dimension cannot and should not be conceived as passive receptors, since 
they actively intervene on texts, making them become “viral” precisely through an act of 
appropriation that refers not only to a specific intention but also to a particular knowledge 
(from the simple act of understanding such texts to their re–semantisation).  
Consequently, if a contagion takes place, it seems to take the shape of a contact, as 
the etymology of the word5 suggests, rather than that of a contamination, as the common 
conception of virality assumes. In this respect, it is interesting to recall Giulia Ceriani’s 
analysis (2004) of contamination and fusion as inter-object relationships. According to the 
Italian scholar, these two modi operandi relate to the semantic axis “multiplicity” vs. “unity” 
in opposite ways: contamination favours multiplicity, by making the original objects that are 
combined together (i.e. “contaminated”) still recognisable in the resulting object; by 
                                                   
3 Step-flow models contrast the idea, claimed by the hypodermic needle theory, that people are directly 
influenced by mass media. According to the two-step flow model developed by Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and 
Hazel Gaudet (1948), for instance, ideas flow from mass media to opinion leaders, and from them to a wider 
population. 
4 Drawing on the idea of “biosphere”, intended as the space within which life exists, Lotman defines the 
semiosphere as the space within which semiosis exists, using such an idea to describe the functioning of culture. 
5 Deriving from the Latin term contagionem, “a touching, contact, contagion”, related to contingere, “touch 
closely” (Online Etymology Dictionary 2019). 
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contrast, fusion completely denies variety, by creating a new, unique object while 
annihilating the pre-existing ones. In online communication, neither the original content nor 
the acts generating viral texts are easily distinguishable; most commonly, a new object is 
generated, and any trace of the pre-existing texts that gave origin to it is lost. If a 
contamination takes place, therefore, it merely represents the anticipation of a subsequent 
process of fusion, which tends to make the former invisible. Any “fusioned” object, in other 
terms, seems to follow a “rhizomatic development” (Deleuze and Guattari 1980): it has no 
roots, nor vertical connections, but spreads horizontally, opposing the organisational 
structure of the tree-system that charts causality along chronological lines and looks for the 
origins of things.  
 
8.3.2. Spreadability: reading conspiracy theories through Jenkins, Ford and Green’s 
approach 
An alternative description of the processes through which online contents are able to 
propagate and reach large amounts of people is provided by Henry Jenkins, Sam Ford and 
Joshua Green in their book Spreadable Media. Creating Value and Meaning in a Networked 
Culture (2013). Here they contrast the concept of “stickiness” — aggregating attention in 
centralised places — with that of “spreadability” — dispersing content widely through 
formal and informal networks. While theories on virality are mainly based on stickiness, the 
three scholars argue that online contents are not replicated perfectly, but rather 
“manipulated” by users, who play therefore a key active role in such a process. In this view, 
the Internet does not merely enhance the replicability of the texts that circulate within it, but 
rather fosters their personalisation and re-interpretation by means of mechanisms of 
manipulation that function as a hook to both users’ engagement and agency (Marino 2015). 
In other words, each appropriation of an online text tends to re-structure it, creating new 
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forms and leading to its re-interpretation (Dusi and Spaziante 2006). Such mechanisms can 
be described primarily in terms of: 
- Sampling: the adoption of a portion or “sample” from a pre-existing text; 
- Remixing: the structural modification of a text, including the insertion of new 
elements, which can be intentional but also unintentional; 
- Remaking: the re-creation of a pre-existing text, which can more or less evidently 
alter such a text. 
Regardless of the specific mechanism in action, it is important to notice that people 
tend not to simply share online contents as they are, but rather to modify and incessantly 
reinterpret them (e.g. by adding comments, combining them with other texts, or de- and re-
contextualising them). This evidently requires users a specific effort, conferring an active 
role on them, and thus undermining the simple idea of a passive infection generally 
associated with the metaphor of virality. In this view, online conspiracy theories are not 
understood as the passive repetition of the same “infective” content across the Internet, but 
rather as the active re-interpretation and adaptation of such content by users, who thus 
confer different meanings on them. 
 
8.3.3. Between abundance and redundancy: the “information overload” and the “echo 
chambers” 
Another crucial characteristic of contemporary communicative systems that can help 
us understand better conspiracy theories and their propagation in present day’s mediascapes 
is the so-called “information overload”: while the Internet has expanded the variety and 
amount of available information, creating a more diverse space for public debate, greater 
access to information has also made it more challenging for the reader to evaluate the 
reliability of information. This has lead scholars to denounce a situation of excess of 
information, which has been alternatively described as “infobesity” (Rogers, Puryear and 
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Root 2013), “infoxication” (Chamorro-Premuzic 2014), “information anxiety” (Wurman 
2012), “explosion” (Buckland 2017) or “overload” (as the most common denomination 
recites). While indisputably enhancing pluralism, in other words, the abundance of sources, 
news and opinions available on social media produces an effect of confusion and uncertainty 
that makes it difficult for users to choose the information to trust and focus their attention 
on. 
Simultaneously, the Web has seen the emergence of the so-called “echo chambers”, 
that is to say situations in which individuals are exposed only to information from like-
minded individuals: 
 
Selective exposure to content is the primary driver of content diffusion and generates the formation of 
homogeneous clusters, i.e., “echo chambers.” Indeed, homogeneity appears to be the primary driver for 
the diffusion of contents and each echo chamber has its own cascade dynamics (Del Vicario et al. 
2016: 554). 
 
Comparing Facebook pages reporting on scientific and conspiracy content, for 
instance, Quattrociocchi and Vicini (2016) showed that users who are deeply engaged in a 
community are more likely to become focused on particular topics, thus becoming 
“isolated” from the neighbouring environment, that is to say, other topics and views. 
Although there is no direct relation between such a phenomenon and the information 
overload, it is interesting to note the difference between the emotional effects deriving 
from them: social media users are likely to find their opinions constantly “echoed” back to 
them, which develops tunnel vision and reinforces individual belief systems over verified 
facts — the search for which, on the contrary, seems to suffer from the anxiety deriving 
from the hardly manageable abundance of information available on the Internet. 
This configuration creates barriers to critical discourse on online media: it feeds 
propaganda and extremism and reduces democracy and critical debate (Sunstein 2017). In 
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this respect, Cass Sunstein (2001) developed the idea of “information cascade” — i.e., when 
Internet users start passing on information they assume is true even though they cannot 
verify it, to denounce that the Internet today creates “cybercascades” of information that 
develop extremely rapid and are therefore very difficult to control. Hence fake news and 
even conspiracy theories are more likely to prosper, generating large communities of 
supporters, as we will see in detail in relation to a specific case study in the following 
paragraph.  
 
8.4. The spread of anti-vax conspiracy theories: a case study 
After describing the major theories and concepts that can help us understand better how 
conspiracy theories proliferate online and with what effects, I would like to briefly consider a 
significant case study in order to empirically demonstrate the above explored development and 
outline their importance in the wide propagation of a specific form of conspiracism, generally 
known as “anti-vax conspiracy theories”. Hence, the next paragraphs will build on the literature to 
reconstruct the main phases of the development and spread of such theories. This will allow 
drawing the concluding remarks presented in the concluding section , where I will also present 
some suggestions for future research. 
 
8.4.1. The “seed” of anti-vax conspiracy theories: the 1998 article by Andrew 
Wakefield 
Opposition to vaccination is not new at all, but dates back to the introduction of 
vaccines themselves (Wolfe and Sharp 2002). Figure 1, for instance, shows a print by Charles 
William published in the early nineteenth century as propaganda against the introduction of 
vaccination as a preventative measure against smallpox. Some of the opponents of 
vaccination, such as Dr Benjamin Moseley (physician at the Royal Hospital Chelsea), are 
named on the obelisk on the right of the print; on the left the vaccinators, wearing bull’s horns 
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and a tail, feed babies to the “Vaccination monster”, which has the front legs of a lion and the 
hind legs of a cow (with both a symbolic reference to its brutality and is a literal reference to 
the animal from which vaccination originated, as the etymology of the word6 clarifies).  
 
 
Figure 1. A monster being fed baskets of infants and excreting them with horns, 
symbolising vaccination and its effects. Etching by C. Williams, 1802(?). 
Credit: Wellcome Collection (https://wellcomecollection.org/works/vbux8st5) - CC BY 
 
This image echoes a then common description of such a horrific creature: 
                                                   
6 Deriving from the Latin term vaccinus, “of” or “from the cow”. The word was introduced by Edward Jenner 
for the technique he devised of preventing smallpox by injecting people with the cowpox virus (variolae vaccinae); 




A mighty and horrible monster, with the horns of a bull, the hind of a horse, the jaws of a krakin, the 
teeth and claws of a tyger, the tail of a cow, all the evils of Pandora’s box in his belly, plague, 
pestilence, leprosy, purple blotches, foetid ulcers, and filthy running sores covering his body, and an 
atmosphere of accumulated disease, pain and death around him, has made his appearance in the world, 
and devores mankind —especially poor helpless infants—not by sores only, or hundreds, or thousands, 
but by hundreds of thousands (in Wolfe and Sharp 2002: 430). 
 
It must be remembered that the smallpox vaccine encountered in fact a huge 
opposition in England and the United States in the nineteenth century: while some objected 
that it was administered by piercing the skin, others disliked that the vaccine came from an 
animal. Moreover, a number of people had a general distrust of medicine, and many opposed 
the vaccine because they believed it violated their personal liberty (see Fullerton Lemons 
2016). 
Controversies then also extended to other substances and acts, from the dispute on the 
efficacy and safety of the diphtheria, tetanus and pertussis immunization to the still lively 
debate regarding the use of a mercury-containing preservative called thimerosal, aluminium 
compounds or other substances considered toxic in vaccines, etc. Among these cases, there is 
one that, more than any other, has resulted in a number of widespread “anti-vax conspiracy 
theories”: the measles, mumps and rubella (MMR) vaccine controversy, which is strictly 
related to the name of the discredited former British gastroenterologist Andrew Wakefield. 
It was 1998 when Wakefield (and other scientists who later retracted their names 
from the study) published an article in The Lancet — one of the oldest and most influential 
medical journals — suggesting a direct relation between the MMR vaccine and the 
development of autism and some chronic intestinal pathologies. In fact, the link was not 
explicitly attested in the paper, but research (see in particular Reeves 2005; Fahnestock 
2009; Kolodziejski 2014) has shown how the rhetorical and textual strategies adopted by 
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Wakefield and his colleagues (e.g. the placement of the claims regarding the possibility of a 
link between the MMR and autism in the discussion section of the article, together with the 
huge presence of polysemous hedges7 to mark them as speculative rather than declarative, 
the extended use of passive-voice constructions to minimise personal references and confer 
a scientific tone even on parents’ or other people’s statements, and a series of other 
interesting elements, cf. Kolodziejski 2014) encouraged such an interpretation8, while 
granting the same writing style of typical research papers. In fact, less than a month after the 
publication, the journal published seven letters (Beale 1998; Bedford et al. 1998; Black, 
Prempeh and Baxter 1998; Lee et al. 1998; Lindley and Milla, 1998; O’Brien, Jones and 
Christie, 1998; Payne and Maxon 1998) that raised concerns about the article, and 
interpreted it as claiming that there is a link between the MMR immunisation and autism9. 
Later on, in 2004, journalist Brian Deer (2004: cf. Deer 2011a, 2011b, 2011c) published an 
investigative report denouncing a conflict of interest on Wakefield’s part: while conducting 
the study, the then gastroenterologist received money from lawyers acting against MMR 
manufacturers for parents of autistic children. Following Deer’s report, The Lancet officially 
retracted the article, and in 2010 the General Medical Council declared Wakefield’s research 
and conduct “irresponsible” and “dishonest” (GMC report, quoted in Gorski 2010). As a 
result, Wakefield was struck off the UK medical register, and the British Medical Journal 
also declared his research “fraudulent” in 2011.  
                                                   
7 The word “hedges” is used in linguistics to refer to mitigating words, sounds or constructions used to lessen 
the impact of an utterance due to constraints on the interaction between the speaker and addressee. 
8 After conducting a careful study of the argumentative and rhetorical style of the paper, Lauren R. 
Kolodziejski states that “although Wakefield may deny proving a relationship between MMR and ASD, his word 
choice scattered throughout the article subtly implied that a link does, indeed, exist” (2014: 172). 
9 A number of scientists, scholars, and journalists have then reinforced such an interpretation; see, for instance, 
Woolcock and Hawkes 2006; Poland and Jacobsen 2011; Rope 2010; Ropeik 2011. 
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Notwithstanding, this case seems to have caused a considerable drop in vaccination 
rates not only in the UK: by 2002, immunization rates dropped below 85%, and even 75% in 
some areas, and fell under the minimum for maintaining ‘‘herd immunity’’ (Fitzpatrick 
2004; Mascarelli 2011)), but also globally. Although scientific research has overtly opposed 
Wakefield’s findings, in fact, anecdotal stories and personal experiences continue to keep 
the issue alive in the public sphere (cf. McCarthy 2011), and a set of “anti-vax conspiracy 
theories” have emerged and spread, especially through the new media. As a result, several 
breakouts of diseases that were considered wiped out thanks to vaccines have been reported 
in recent years (e.g., the latest data by the World Health Organization (WHO 2019) reported 
a 30% increase in measles cases globally), leading international bodies (such as the WHO 
itself) to include “vaccine hesitancy” on the list of the biggest global health threats today. In 
other words, not only is the MMR case related to viruses from a medical point of view, but it 
has also become “viral” in terms of communication, affecting current perceptions and 
behaviours in spite of all official rejection and legal action against its fraudulent promoter. 
How can this development be understood and, particularly, what is the role of the Internet in 
this?  
 
8.4.2. Beyond the (retracted) article: the role of the media in the reception of 
Wakefield’s claims 
A considerable part of scientific research does not gain much attention beyond a 
restricted community of interested scientists. However, as reported above, Wakefield’s 
article continues to garner attention on a global scale even 20 years after its publication, and 
despite being repudiated by most of the authors involved in its publication and officially 
retracted by the journal that initially published it. Various factors should be considered to 
explain this.   
First of all, it should be noted that “much of the relevance of scientific articles is 
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extratextual, not spelled out in the discourse but supplied by context” (Fahnestock 1986: 
278). In this sense, a crucial role was played by the press conference held the day before the 
official publication of the article in The Lancet in which Wakefield communicated his 
theory about MMR-autism to the general public. Kolodziejski showed how, given the 
different interpretive practices employed in the public sphere, this communication created a 
sort of interpretative “short circuit”:  
 
Whereas a like-minded technical audience well versed in communicating uncertainty should 
understand the speculative nature of hedged claims and the need for additional research to 
substantiate them, a public audience less familiar with the discursive norms of scientific rhetoric 
may interpret such statements as established claims. This “science by press conference” process 
causes concern because it creates opportunities for researchers to present information that 
extends beyond what the reviewers thought they were authorizing in approving a piece for 
publication (2014: 180).  
 
It should also be remembered that Wakefield took part in a series of other speeches 
and public appearances, recommending single vaccines rather than the combined MMR 
immunisation, thus evidently influencing the context of reception of his article. As a result, 
in the media, the link between the MMR immunisation and autism immediately became 
predominant10. 
What is more, Wakefield himself has continued defending his research and anti-
vaccinist theory through various media, including a book (Callous Disregard: Autism and 
Vaccines -- The Truth Behind a Tragedy, 2010) and a movie (Vaxxed: From Cover-Up to 
Catastrophe, 2016). Not only do such works insist on the relation between the MMR 
                                                   
10 On February 26, 1998, for instance, the Royal Free Hospital School of Medicine distributed a press release 
titled “New research links autism and bowel disease”, and the day after BBC News included “Child vaccine linked to 
autism” within its news. 
 16 
immunisation and autism, but they re-contextualise the retraction of the 1998 paper and its 
consequences in the frame of a “second level conspiracy theory”. This is manifest in their 
titles, which insist on ideas such as truth concealment, cruelty, and tragedy (and even a real 
“catastrophe”!), and finds particular expression in the trailer of the movie, since its very 
opening. Just after the sponsors’ logos, in fact, the images zoom in on a “warning” in white 
capital letters on a black background: “THE FILM THEY DON’T WANT YOU TO SEE” 
(adopting the typical rhetorical style of conspiracy theories, with an undefined subject – 
“they” – and a direct call to the addressee – “you”). A provocative question therefore 
appears, while a toxic-looking blue substance invades the screen: “ARE YOUR CHILDREN 
SAFE?” (with a reiterated call to the addressee). The following scenes then clarify the 
meaning of such notices: not only does a link between vaccines and autism exist, as 
Wakefield’s study revealed in 1998, but it has been covered up by the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC), which allegedly manipulated and destroyed data about the 
effects of vaccines, as an insider revealed on a phone “confession” to the environmental 
biologist Brian Hooker. Such arguments are supported by juxtaposing an audiovisual 
reconstruction of the phone call with short interviews with various kinds of experts (from 
“medical journalist” Del Bigtree to Doreen Granpeeshes, founder of the Center for Autism 
and Related Disorders, to “Senior Research Scientist” Stephanie Steneff and Wakefield 
himself, presented as a “gastroenterologist”, without any mention of his expulsion from the 
medical register) and parents of children with autism, whose disorders are also insistently 
shown throughout the trailer.  
The film recalls the textual strategies discussed for Wakefield’s article, although with 
changes in style and tone, as required by this particular medium. These strategies resulted, in 
fact, in the same interpretative processes underlined in the case of the paper published in The 
Lancet. While first scheduled to premiere at New York’s 2016 Tribeca Film Festival, the 
movie was withdrawn from the programme at a later stage, after doctors and health 
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professionals denounced the screening and Festival co-funder Robert De Niro reversed 
course, saying that the projection would not have contributed to a profitable discussion 
about medical and public health issues (see Goodman 2016; Ryzik 2016). Moreover, its 
description has been a matter of discussion, with Wakefield presenting it as a 
“documentary”, while critics strongly contrasting such a definition (see, for instance, Kohn 
2016; June 2006; Vonder Haar 2016) and rather referred to it as a “pseudoscience film”. 
 
8.4.3. Beyond Wakefield’s case: anti-vax conspiracy theories on social media 
As illustrated above, the various media initiatives Wakefield organised around his 
article are essential to understand contemporary anti-vax conspiracy theories, from the 
claims concerning the correlation between the MMR immunisation and autism to those 
denouncing the institutional and political interests in covering up scientific research. What is 
more, the media played a crucial role in making the MMR-autism controversy hold out 
against the retraction of the paper: not only did Wakefield use them to provide alternative 
versions of what happened and for what reasons, but his arguments and ideas quickly moved 
from the mass to the new media, generating a widespread cybercascade. Since the 
publication of the Lancet article, in fact, an increasing number of autism advocacy groups 
and parents have continued to support Wakefield’s position on blogs (e.g. Age of Autism), 
social networks (primarily on Facebook, where a number of anti-vaccination groups, such as 
Stop Mandatory Vaccination or Vitamin C Against Vaccine Damage, have arisen over time), 
comments to online articles about the retraction, or on websites of groups or organizations 
founded or sponsored by famous actors and other celebrities (e.g. Jenny McCarthy’s 
Generation Rescue). 
Such a phenomenon rapidly extended beyond Wakefield’s case, making social 
networks become key actors in the rise and spread of forms of antivaccinists 
conspiracionism online (cf. Wong 2019). Facebook search results for groups and pages 
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about vaccines, for instance, seem to be dominated by anti-vax propaganda, while 
YouTube’s recommendation algorithm has been accused of driving users from fact-based 
medical information directly toward anti-vaccine misinformation. After criticism became 
manifest, both platforms started to address more efforts to control misinformation. However, 
their new policies have been primarily targeting fake news and hoaxes around politics (e.g. 
elections, immigration, racial discord, etc.), leaving anti-vaccination propaganda in the 
background. While both platforms have assured the public that they are exploring new 
options for addressing misinformation about vaccines and other health-related issues and 
hoping to be able to do so soon, right now even a simple search for neutral words such as 
“vaccine” or “vaccination” still steers users toward anti-vaccine propaganda, redirecting to 
groups such as Stop Mandatory Vaccination or Vaccination Re-education Discussion 
Forum. What is more, Facebook has been accepting advertising from anti-vax groups, such 
as Vax Truther, Anti-Vaxxer, Vaccines Revealed, the above-mentioned Stop Mandatory 
Vaccination11 and others (Pilkington and Gleza 2019), thus further spreading 
misinformation. Such mechanisms evidently enhance the “echo chamber” effect we describe 
above, since users are exposed only to anti-vax-oriented information which reinforces tunnel 
vision. What is more, they function as a “hook” for external users. Not only are people 
redirected to the groups by search engines and algorithms, but the groups’ posts tend to 
originate emotional involvement, leading their members not only to express their ideas by 
liking or reacting to them through the common tools offered by social media, but also to 
                                                   
11 Whose advertised post “Parents, not only can any vaccine given at any age kill your child, but if this 
unthinkable tragedy does occur, doctors will dismiss it as ‘sudden infant death syndrome’ (Sids)”, showing a picture of 
a baby with his eyes closed and stating his name and date of birth and death — “Owen Matthew Stokes (Aug 18, 2017 - 
Oct 25, 2017) — followed by the text “stopmandatoryvaccination.com - 2-month old Dies 48 hours After 8 Vaccines: 
Owen’s Mom”, was censured by the UK’s The Advertising Standards Authority (ASA) in November 2018. 
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share them on their personal profile or within their social circles (Chiou and Tucker 2018). 
As a result, a number of Internet memes against vaccines, such as ironic drawings 
denouncing the conflicts of interest behind vaccinations or accusing them of causing illness 
in perfectly healthy children, have widely spread through social networks. By playing on the 
emotive dimension and using a certain dose of sarcasm, such messages easily create interest 
and involvement, favouring the open-ended participation of users who get in touch with 
them. In fact, humour and parody are among the factors that, according to Jenkins, Ford and 
Green (2013), make content spread, especially when they are used to criticise specific 
cultural patterns in contemporary societies. Despite their differences12, both humour and 
parody  foster spreadability because they represent “a vehicle by which people articulate and 
validate their relationships with those with whom they share the joke” (Jenkins, Ford and 
Green 2013: 204). Furthermore, the emphasis these messages generally put on the visual 
dimension — with drawings, images and captivating and easily readable fonts 
accompanying them — enhances their visibility and spreadibility. 
Aware of such mechanisms, scientists and experts have also started to use social 
media to contrast anti-vaccinist propaganda. In this sense, ironic messages have proved to be 
particular effective. For instance, Ah ma non è Lercio, an Italian satirical website and 
Facebook page that features fictional news, whose humorous, comic and grotesque tone 
makes fun of contemporary sensational journalism, released in 2014 a provocative article 
entitled “Anziano muore in un incidente stradale, la famiglia: ‘L’ha ucciso il vaccino’” 
                                                   
12 The authors consider humour and parody separately because “while all humor builds on whether an audience 
‘gets’ the joke or shares a sensibility, parody combines that aspect of humor with a specific shared reference. This is 
precisely what makes parody valuable — it can express shared experiences and, especially when it plays on nostalgic 
references, a shared history” (Jenkins, Ford and Green 2013: 207). However, both “those who are creating humor and 
parody claim specific common experiences with those who are laughing at the joke” (Jenkins, Ford and Green 2013: 
207). 
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[Elderly man dies in a car accident; his family: ‘A vaccine killed him’, my translation]. This 
rapidly reached a thousand shares only on Facebook, and led to a number of ironic and also 
serious comments (for further details, see Stano 2016). Shares and interactions further 
increased as Lercio became more active on Facebook. Another nonsense ironical article 
entitled “Troppi metalli nei vaccini: bambino arrugginisce dopo il bagnetto” [Two many 
metals in vaccines: kid gets rusty after taking a bath, our translation], released in 2017 and 
posted on Lercio’s Facebook page in February 2019, obtained more than 22.000 reactions13, 
almost a thousand comments (with a number of reactions each), and more than 5.500 shares. 
However, in some cases, this type of communication turned out to have adverse 
effects. For instance, in 2013, the Photoshop Phriday forum on the humour website 
Something Awful (SA) launched a competition requiring applicants to create an ironic image 
on the correlation between vaccines and the physical or mental diseases generally asserted 
by anti-vaccinists. One of the examples related vaccines to heroin, ironically depicting a 
drug addict slumped in a corner with the text: “Their first injection was a vaccination: 
protect your children from vaccinations”, and slightly above, another satirical note: 
“Vaccination leaves a lasting psychological belief that injecting is beneficial. Children who 
are vaccinated are 85% more likely to inject heroin than those who are not”. Although 
ironically intended, this image rapidly went viral on social networks and found its way on to 
Sunshine Coast Facebook pages, fomenting the idea that it illustrated a scarily real statistic 
linking heroin use to childhood vaccinations. The Sunshine Coast Local Medical 
Association president, Dr Minuskin, then publicly rejected the image, inviting everyone to 
stop sharing it: “If anyone receives this image via social media I would recommend they 
                                                   
13 Reactions are an extension of the “Like button” to give users more ways to share their reaction to a post in a 
quick and easy way. They include: “Like”, “Love”, “Haha”, “Wow”, “Sad” and “Angry” 
(https://en.facebookbrand.com/assets/reactions/). 
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swiftly assign it to the trash box where it belongs. Not only is the information outrageously 
incorrect, it is irresponsible to be creating unwarranted fear about such an important issue” 
(in Mikkelson 2015). Nonetheless, users continued to comment on and to share the image. 
Ultimately, it also became appropriated by advocates of antivaccinists’ propaganda, which 
accused vaccines’ “serv[ing] as a gateway drug to heroin” (Feminists Against Vaccination 
FB page, post left on 26 October 2015; the first post sharing the image appeared on 8 March 
2015, as reported in Mikkelson 2015).  
This example allows a series of interesting reflections. First of all, it is interesting to 
note that, unlike Charles William’s “vaccination monster”, which has remained unaltered 
until now, Internet memes about vaccinations have evidently changed rapidly as a result of 
the interpretative and communicative acts performed by the people who received, 
appropriated, and shared it. Here is where, as we have seen, the concept of “spreadability” 
comes into play, emphasising the audiences’ agency, since “their choices, investments, 
agendas, and actions determine what gets valued” (Jenkins, Ford and Green 2013: 21). 
Furthermore, this case evidently indicates the “fusion processes” and the “rhizomatic 
development” motivated by online content spreading: an explicitly ironic message was 
completely misunderstood (and therefore shared as real information) by various users and 
groups precisely because of the lack of roots indicating its origin and context. There is no 
identifiable author, nor context, since in most cases the original post was not included, and a 
new (sampled, and sometimes even remixed) object was generated. This further emphasises 
the users’ crucial role in online content spreading, since they “pluralize the meanings and 
pleasures mass culture offers, evade or resist its disciplinary efforts, fracture its homogeneity 
or coherence, raid or poach upon its terrain” (Fiske 1989: 28). The uncontrollable and 
unpredictable path of this Internet meme clearly shows how people produce culture 
precisely by integrating products and texts into their everyday lives, sometimes even 
implying forms of misunderstanding and aberrant decoding.  
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8.5. Conclusion 
The case of anti-vax conspiracy theories clearly shows how the Internet, and in particular 
social networks, have proved fundamental for the spread and development of such theories. If mass 
media undoubtedly played a crucial role in the reception and recognition of Wakefield’s arguments 
and the conspiracies theories originating from them, also including his more recent claims re-
interpreting its rejections as part of a broader conspiracy trying to hide the truth, it has been with 
social media that anti-vax propaganda and conspiracy theories have reached the large spread they 
have today, in various cases even independently from the British former doctor’s arguments. In fact, 
as we have seen, anti-vax conspiracy theories have had a “horizontal” development, lacking any 
organisational structure that indicate causality along chronological lines and allow to retrace their 
origins. On the contrary, they have been continuously sampled, remixed and even remade by online 
users, sometimes also evidently being resemantised, that is to say, given new meanings. Such a 
rhizomatic development, in fact, is likely to cause misunderstanding and aberrant decoding, since it 
leaves no traces of the processes that led to it.  
Nonetheless, this does not seem to acquire much importance within social media 
communications: regardless of the truthfulness of posts and online contents, people have not ceased 
sharing, reacting to and commenting on them, thus nurturing unpredictable and hardly stoppable 
cybercascades. In fact, the forms of “online conviviality” (Varis and Blommaert 2014) brought 
about by the Web 2.0 have made “social trust” emerge and become the base of a number of 
narratives whose verification transcends any reference to proved facts, and rather relies on other 
narratives (Perissinotto 2016; cf. Erdmann 2016; Madisson 2016). 
From such a perspective, therefore, conspiracy theories can be conceived as a symptom of a 
larger problem embedded in the infrastructure of current communication systems, that is to say, the 
so-called “post-truth” era: in contemporary rhetoric, the subjective and passionate component (i.e. 
appeals to emotion and personal belief) has become evidently more influential than the referential 
one, to the extent that personal beliefs have replaced verified facts (Lorusso 2018). The considered 
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case study suggests that the Web 2.0, and especially social media, motivate today’s post-truth 
society: the mechanism of followers and likes on which such media are based does not dismantle 
falsehoods, but rather reinforces them, making sharing and belonging prevail over reliability and 
truth. Thus echoes resound louder and louder in the rooms of the Internet, where people, although 
creatively expressing their agency, are risking to loose the crucial ability for effective 
communication and discerning reliable and accurate information from falsehood and fake news. In 
this sense, we would conclude, the rapid spread of conspiracy theories should not be simply 
dismissed as a symptom of a paranoid or unreasonable society, as it is sometimes claimed. It should 
rather be conceived and studied as a consequence of the limited access to factual truth and 
experiences characterising contemporary societies, as well as of the increased difficulty to verify 
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